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I.
Chandler's 1 seeks a ruling that service charges to customers related to preparing and
serving food, which were not retained by Chandler's and were given to the employees involved
in the preparation and service of food, are not subject to the Idaho sales tax as tangible personal
property. The plain language of the relevant statutes supports Chandler's' position, as does the
Legislature's clarification of Idaho Code Section 63-3613 in 2011.
Chandler's does not argue that the Amendment should be applied beyond the retroactive
date identified in the Amendment. Instead, the Amendment demonstrates that Commission Rule
43.04, which was the catalyst for the Amendment, was contrary to the language of Idaho Code
Section 63-3613. The Amendment supports the position Chandler's has advanced all along-that
the Gratuities are not subject to the Idaho sales tax. The Amendment made the legislature's
position explicit, but that does not mean that the pre-Amendment version of the statute does not
support Chandler's' position. Additionally, there is Idaho precedent supporting application of the
substance of a clarificatory amendment, like the Amendment, to circumstances arising before the
effective date of the amendment. The Commission has not rebutted this precedent.
The District Court Decision, which relied on Commission Rules that were unreasonable
and contrary to the relevant statutes, should be reversed.

The terms used herein have the meanings defined in the Opening Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Chandler's-Boise,
LLC, filed October 11, 2016 ("Opening Brief').
1
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REPLY
Under the plain language of the pre-Amendment Idaho Code Section 63-3613, the
Gratuities are not subject to the sales tax.
1. The Gratuities are exempt from the sales tax because the term "sales price" does

not include the services at issue here.
Chandler's agrees with the Commission that the language of Idaho Code Section 63-3613
is plain and that "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect .... "' Respondent Idaho State Tax Commission's Brief,
filed December 8, 2016 ("Commission Brief') p. 5 (citing Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cty. Bd. of
Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152,345 P.3d 207,211 (2015) (hereafter "Jayo")).
Contrary to the Commission's position, however, Idaho Code Section 63-3613, and in
particular subsections (b)(4) and (b)(8), unambiguously establish that the Gratuities are not
subject to the sales tax and that the Commission failed to properly apply Idaho Code Section 633613 to the Gratuities. The Legislature expressed such intent by the plain meaning of the preand post-Amendment versions of Idaho Code Section 63-3613-which is, that service charges
like the Gratuities should not be subject to the sales tax.
a. The Commission's reliance on Idaho Code Section 63-3612(2)(b) is
price"-the
misplaced because that section defines "sale," not
"sales
tax base for applying the sales tax.
As explained in Chandler's' Opening Brief, Idaho Code Section 63-3619, the principal
statute that imposes the Idaho sales tax, states in relevant part, "An excise tax is hereby imposed
upon each sale at retail at the rate of six percent (6%) of the sales price of all retail sales subject
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§

each of these three emphasized terms in order to be subject to an excise tax. Chandler's
does not dispute that the Gratuities arose as part of a "sale" and "retail sales;" but Chandler's
vigorously disputes that the definition of the "sales price" includes the Gratuities paid in this
case. See LC. § 63-36I2(2)(b); I.C. § 63-3609.
The Commission relies upon Idaho Code Section 63-3612(2)(b) to allege that the
Gratuities are taxable. Commission Brief p. 6, pp. 10-11. 3 But while Idaho Code Section 633612(2)(b) includes gratuities in the definition of a "sale," this does not mean that the Gratuities
at issue here are subject to the sales tax. See I.C. § 63-3619 (titled "Imposition and Rate of the
Sales Tax").
Even though Idaho Code Section 63-36I2(2)(b) references services performed in
conjunction with the "sale" of food and beverages, this does not negate the broad exception of
gratuities from "sales price" under Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b). Notably, the Amendment
dealt only with Idaho Code Section 63-3613 (definition and exceptions for "sales price"), and the
Legislature did not similarly address Idaho Code Section 63-3612 (definition of "sale"), yet the
Commission amended its rules in response to the Amendment to provide that no sales tax applies
to a gratuity paid in addition to a meal (when certain conditions are met). See Commission Brief
p. 36 and Addendum Document No. 8 thereto. If it were eorreet that the definition of "sale"

2

The citations to the tax provisions of the Idaho Code herein refer to the applicable 2010 version, with the exception
of reference to the Amendment.
3 The Commission also cites to legislative history for Idaho Code Section 63-3612(2)(b), which is not relevant
because Chandler's does not dispute that the Gratuities arose as part of a "sale" as defined by that statute. See
Commission Brief pp. 12-13.
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over
Code Section 63-3612 in order to necessitate the Commission's post-Amendment rule changes.
The District Court, therefore, incorrectly ruled that the definition of a "sale" under Idaho
Code Section 63-3612(b) v.rould preempt the application of the "sales price" exemptions found in
Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b). R. p. 130. Absent a "sale" falling within the definition of "sales
price," no "sale" can be subject to the sales tax. See I.C. § 63-3619 (requiring more than just a
"sale," but also requiring a "sale at retail" and imposing a 6% sales tax upon the "sales price").
b. Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b) specifically excludes charges attributable
to "services rendered in . . . applying the property sold" and "service
charges."

The Commission argues that Idaho Code Section 63-3613(a)(2)-the broad definition of
"sales price"-applies to the Gratuities because it includes "labor or service costs." The
Commission then argues that the exemptions found in the same section do not apply to the
Gratuities. Commission Brief p. 7 (citing LC.§ 63-3613 and Commission Rules).
The exceptions set forth in Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b)(4) and § (b)(6) are not so
narrow as to exclude the Gratuities. Indeed, Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b) just as broadly
exempts gratuities from the definition of "sales price" because such charges represent "[t]he
amount charged for labor or services rendered in installing or applying the property sold . .. " or
"[t]he amount charged for finance charges, carrying charges, service charges ...", as long as
neither amount is used as a means of avoiding sales tax on the actual sales of tangible personal
property. See I.C. § 63-3613(b)(4) and (b)(6) (emphasis added).
There are no facts in the Record of this case to demonstrate how the exemptions in Idaho
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63-3613(b)(4)

cannot apply to

charges

service of food are stated separately-as is undisputed in this case. R. pp. 36, 48 (Stip. ,I 12, Ex.
D). The Commission's examples related to Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b)(4) are not found in
the statutory text, but r::ither arP fonncl in thP f'ommi<s<sion Rnlf~'<. f'ommi<s<sion Rrief p. 8.

Chandler's' position may conflict with the Commission Rules, but it does not contradict the plain
language of the statute.
Similarly, the Commission argues that the Gratuities cannot fall under the exemption for
"services charges" under Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b )(6) because that section applies solely to
financial or bank-related charges. Commission Brief pp. 9-10. While it is true that subsection
(b)(6) lists certain financial-related charges, it also lists, without qualification, "service charges."
The Gratuities are separately stated service charges paid to those involved in preparing or serving
a meal, and not retained by Chandler's. R. p. 96 (Affidavit of Rex Chandler ,I 3). To the extent
Chandler's carries the burden of showing applicability of a sales tax exemption (see Commission
Brief p. 25), Chandler's has shown that the Gratuities are excepted from the definition of "sales
price" under Idaho Code Section 63-3613(b)(6), and are thus exempt from the sales tax.
The Commission cites to the 1965 legislative history related to Idaho Code Sections 6336 l 3(b )(4) and (b)(6) to support its argument that the Gratuities do not fall within these
exceptions. Commission Brief p. 13. However, with both parties arguing that Idaho Code Section
63-3613 is unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. This is
because [t]he asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning."
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158

at 1

at 211

(brackets

2. The Commission Rules do not change the plain language of Idaho Code Section
63-3613 and should not take precedence over the statute where the rules are not
grounded in the language of the statute.
There is no dispute between the parties about which rules were applied in this case.
Opening Brief pp. 8-1 O; Commission Brief pp. 5-6. In spite of the plain language of Idaho Code
Section 63-3613, Commission Rule 43.04, defining gratuities, and Commission Rule 43.05,
defining service charges, created a distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary charges for
tips. The sales tax does not apply to a tip if the customer is advised that he may decline to pay the
tip, but does apply if the customer is not so advised. Commission Rule 43.04. Additionally,
"service charges" are "part of the selling price of the meals or drinks" and are subject to the sales
tax. Commission Rule 43.05. These rules resulted in the Gratuities, which consisted of charges
for services, being improperly taxed the same way as tangible personal property. This was not a
reasonable application of the law.

a. The District Court relied heavily on Commission Rule 43.04.
There is no doubt that the District Court relied on Commission Rule 43.04 in reaching its
decision that the Gratuities were subject to the sales tax. The District Court Decision began with
a discussion of the applicability of Commission Rule 43.04, explaining that when a charge is
added and a customer is not advised he can decline the charge, it is not a gratuity. R. pp. 127128. As such, the District Court found that this case did not involve gratuities, and that the
Gratuities are subject to the sales tax under Commission Rule 43.04. R. p. 128. The District
Court also ruled that the statutory exemption did not apply, and ended by again noting that "the
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case were not

were

tax.

p. 13L

Commission Rule 43.04, therefore, carried substantial weight in the District Court Decision.
b. Commission Rule 43.04 is not entitled to deference because the
voluntariness distinction is not reasonable.
The parties agree that the four-part Simplot test applies to determine agency deference.

See generally JR. Simplot Co. v. Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991).
Additionally, the parties do not dispute that the Commission is entrusted to administer the
relevant statutes, so the first element related to agency deference is met in this case. As to the
second element, the Commission has yet to identify a reasonable basis for its rules that is based
on the language of the applicable statutes, instead asserting its rules have been approved by the
Legislature at various times and can be clearly administered in practice. Each of the
Commission's arguments must fail.
First, contrary to the Commission's assertion (see Commission Brief pp. 14-15), the fact
that the Legislature stated in 1996 that existing Commission Rules would remain in effect does
not mean that the Legislature explicitly approved of Commission Rule 43.04. Rather, the
Legislature simply made clear that despite a statutory amendment effective in 1997, the existing
rules would remain in full force and effect until rescinded or amended by the Commission.
Second, legislative history for a failed statutory amendment in 1988 does not change the
plain language of Idaho Code Section 63-3613 and does not render Commission Rule 43.04
reasonable. The Commission points to legislative history for a bill that never became law as
evidence that Commission Rule 43.04 is reasonable. Commission Brief pp. 16-18. For unknown
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1

not

Amendment

L That, however, does not prove that Commission Rule 43.04 is reasonable. Essentially, the
Commission asks this Court to afford greater weight to a bill that never passed than to the
-

Amenoment which did nass_
has set forth Idaho law concernirnI
r - - - Chandler's
'--' the effect of a
----

----·-------..,

<

---

-

--

--

-

_,

clarificatory amendment like the Amendment (see infra), but the Commission set forth no Idaho
law demonstrating what weight, if any, a failed amendment should be afforded (and Chandler's
located none).
Third, the Commission's substantive defense of its rules has no foundation in the
statutory text. The Commission argues that Commission Rule 43.04 provided a "bright line" rule
for taxability, and that the distinction somehow fit into the definition of "sale" and "sales price."
Commission Brief p. 16. However, nothing in Idaho Code Sections 63-3612 or 63-3613 provides
for a distinction based on whether a gratuity is disclosed as voluntary or not, so it is unclear how
the distinction "neatly" and "squarely" fits into those statutory provisions, as the Commission
contends. Commission Brief p. 16. The Commission has yet to identify the specific basis for its
rules in the statutes and has not shown how the distinction based on voluntariness, rather than on
the intrinsic nature of charges themselves, is reasonable.
Fourth and finally, Commission Rule 43.04 conflicts with the Commission's mixed
transaction test met by Chandler's, which is further evidence of the unreasonableness of the
Commission Rules. Opening Brief pp. 9-10. The District Court made no ruling on the mixed
transaction issue. The Commission, however, asserts that Chandler's is wrong and that IDAPA §
35.01.02.l 1.02(c) does not apply to restaurants or meal services. The Commission relies on its
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non-exhaustive illustrative list of mixed transactions-which does not mention restaurants.
Commission Brief pp. 22-25. For the reasons stated in its Opening Brief, Chandler's contends

are two distinct transactions that are not taxed identically. This supports Chandler's argument
that Commission Rule 43.04, which in this case caused services to be taxed as personal property,
is not reasonable.
c. Commission Rule 43.04 is not entitled to deference because it conflicts
with Idaho Code Sections 63-3612 and 3613.

As to the third element related to agency deference, the Commission asserts on the one
hand that "[t]he statute does not expressly treat the technical matter at issue," and on the other
hand that "Idaho Code§§ 63-3612 and§ 3613 clearly impose tax on the meals in question in this
matter." Commission Brief p. 18. Idaho Code Sections 63-3612 and 3613, however, make no
distinction concerning voluntariness of the requirement of payment of the gratuity as the
Commission has done in its rules. And, the Commission never identifies a statutory foundation
for its voluntariness distinction. Commission Brief pp. 18-19.

Indeed, whether the gratuity

relates to the sale of a service or a tangible good is one rational and reasonable interpretation of
the statute, or perhaps whether or not the gratuity is actually received by the business as part of
the sale or given over to the server, another such reasonable interpretation. But it is completely
arbitrary (and what the Legislature was acting to "clarify") in light of the language of the statutes
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a

of food service

price includes

"gratuities" but does not include discretionary gratuities.
Finally, the Commission argues that the rationales underlying the rule of deference are
present here. Commission Brief pp, 19-22, Because, however, the Commission's interpretation
set forth in Rule 43.04 fails the second and third prongs of the Simplot test, there is no reason to
analyze the rationales underlying the fourth prong and the rule of deference, and spend the pages
of briefing as does the Commission in its brief discussing Canty v. Idaho State Tax Commission,
138 Idaho 178, 59 P.3d 983 (2002). This Court should not give Rule 43.04 deference and should
instead apply the statutory language, as clarified by the Amendment in 2011.

B.

The Amendment clarified the meaning of Idaho Code Section 63-3613 and the
legislative history of the Amendment demonstrates that the Commission Rules
misinterpreted the statute.
1. Chandler's does not challenge the Amendment's retroactivity date.

The Commission asserts that Chandler's is asking this Court to apply the Amendment
beyond the stated retroactive date. Commission Brief pp. 25-29. Chandler's, however,
acknowledged that "the legislature made the Amendment effective and retroactive to January 1,
2011 (outside the Audit Period) .... " Opening Brief p. 15. Chandler's does not and could not
assert an earlier retroactive date for the Amendment. Thus, the explicit exclusion of gratuities
and tips from the definition of "sales price" in subpart (f) of Idaho Code Section 63-3613 does
not apply to the Gratuities.
However, that the explicit exclusion in subpart (f) does not apply to the Gratuities does
not mean that the Amendment is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the Gratuities
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are

to

tax

Idaho

13. Chandler's'

lS

addition of subpart (f) clarified the meaning of the statute and reinforced how the statute should
have been applied all along. 4 As described below, Idaho authority concerning the impact of
clarificatory amendments supports Chandler's' position.
Contrary to the Commission's assertion, this Court's decision in Jayo is consistent with
Chandler's' argument. In Jayo, a real estate developer sought a site improvement tax exemption
based on a 2012 statute allowing for an exemption for property held by "the land developer." 158
Idaho at 151, 345 P .3d at 210. The developer asserted that under the plain language of the
statute, it was entitled to the exemption, and further argued that a 2013 amendment to the statute
made clear that the developer was entitled to the exemption. Id. The Jayo court ruled that the
2012 statute was unambiguous and that the developer did not qualify for the exemption under the
plain language of the 2012 statute. Id. at 151-52, 345 P.3d at 210-1 L As to the 2013 amendment,
it changed the statutory language at issue in a way that would have permitted the exemption
sought by the developer. Id. at 153, 345 P.3d at 212. The court ruled that it did not need to
consider the 2013 amendment because the 2012 statute unambiguously barred the exemption
sought by the developer. Id. The Jayo court further stated that because the 2013 amendment was
only retroactive to January 1, 2013, the court would not apply the amendment to the developer's
asserted 2012 exemption. Id. at 154, 345 P.3d at 213.

4 Chandler's does not assert the Gratuities fall under the explicit exemption of subpart (f) added by the Amendment.
The Commission's argument regarding the narrow construction of the 2011 exemption is thus inapposite.
Commission Briefp. 37.
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not

a tax was

because of an administrative rule with no basis in the relevant statutes, and where the legislature
clarified a statute as a result of an agency rule that was inconsistent with the statute.
Additionally, as explained above, the plain language of the pre-Amendment statute supports
Chandler's' position, whereas in Jayo, the plain language of the pre-amendment statute
unambiguously defeated the developer's position. The Commission's attempt to recast
Chandler's' argument as one of retroactivity rather than clarification and to bring this case within
the rule of Jayo should be rejected.

2. The Amendment was a response to the Commission Rules, showing that the
Commission had misinterpreted the statute by taxing services as goods.
The Legislature's addition of subpart (f) to Idaho Code Section 63-3613 supports
Chandler's' position that the Gratuities should never have been subject to the Idaho sales tax for
two reasons: (1) the legislative history of the Amendment demonstrates that the Amendment was
necessary because of the Commission's misinterpretation of the statute, and (2) the legislature
explicitly stated that the purpose of the Amendment was to "clarify" the meaning of the statute.
The Amendment added subpart (f) to Idaho Code Section 63-3613:
(f) Sales price shall not include a gratuity or tip received when paid to the
service provider of a meal. The gratuity or tip can be either voluntary or
mandatory, but must be given for the service provided and as a supplement to
the service provider's income.
2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 628 (Addendum to Opening Brief p. 5).
Chandler's does not dispute that subpart (f) contains language that was not previously
included in Idaho Code Section 63-3613 or that Commission Rule 43.04 was longstanding. See
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was
years and was enforced by the Tax Commission at least one other time in 2011 (see
Commission Brief p. 32) does not mean that the Commission was legally correct in doing so and
does not undercut the relevance of the Amendment in interpreting the pre-Amendment version of
Idaho Code Section 63-3613.
There is no need to guess at the Legislature's purpose in enacting the Amendment
because the legislative history is clear and the Legislature stated its intent in the act. As
explained in Chandler's' Opening Brief, the legislation was needed to: (1) resolve a discrepancy
caused by the Commission Rules; (2) correct a double-taxation issue; and (3) clarify and make
consistent that services are not subject to the sales tax. Opening Brief pp. 14-15.
The Commission asserts that "[t]he Legislature did not strengthen the law by the 2011
Amendment, it changed the law," and further asserts that "[a] statutory amendment is assumed to
change existing law rather than strengthen it." Commission Brief p. 29 and n. 2. The Supreme
Court of Idaho, however, explained in Stonecipher v. Stonecipher that "[i]n enacting
amendments to existing statutes, the legislature must have intended to clarify, strengthen or
make some change in existing statutes." 131 Idaho 735, 963 P .2d 1172 (1998) (emphasis added).
The use of the disjunctive "or" indicates that amendments can have various purposes, including
clarification.
The Statement of Purpose for the Amendment provides that the bill: "[a]dds language to
clarify that sales price shall not include a gratuity or tip when serving meals, and therefore, is not

taxed, making consistent that services are exempt from sales tax." See Addendum to Opening
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was
gratuity or tip received when paid to the service provider of a meal .... " 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws
628 (emphasis added) (Addendum to Opening Brief p. 5). 5
-De,:n1te
-~r- - rene:::iterl
--r------- 11,:e
---- of
-- the
-~--

word
:::inti
· --- "clarifv"
-- ----.;
------- the
---- le1,1i,:13tive
- o-------- - hi,:torv_
- --- - .; ) the- Commission
-

maintains that the Amendment "had to be passed to change longstanding law" and that the
comments in the legislative history "reflect significant changes in the law .... " Commission
Brief pp. 33-34. This position ignores the Legislature's use of the word "clarify" and the
legislative history showing the Commission's application of the Commission Rules was the
catalyst for the Amendment.
Additionally, the Commission argues that its post-Amendment changes to Rule 43.04
show that the Amendment changed the law. Commission Brief pp. 36-37. All the postAmendment rule shows, however, is that the Commission had to change Commission Rule 43.04
because it was blatantly inconsistent with the Amendment-which did not distinguish between

5

It is important to note that this language appears in the Bill itself that was passed by the Legislature,
even though it does not appear in the codified law. We are not, therefore, simply talking about legislative
history indicating an intent to "clarify" but simply reading the express language of the statute as so
indicating. As was recently stated by this Court:
All portions of a bill that is passed by the Legislature become law in the absence of a
gubernatorial veto, even if not compiled in the Idaho Code. We recently explored this
issue in Peterson v. Peterson, 156 Idaho 85, 320 P.3d 1244 (2014). There, the district
court held that a retroactivity clause contained within a bill which was not assigned a
statutory designation within the Idaho Code 'was merely legislative history' and could
not be considered when reviewing unambiguous statutes. Id. at 88, 320 P.3d at 1247. We
held that the district court erred in so holding, stating: 'The entire bill became a law
regardless of how it was compiled in the Idaho Code.'
Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870,
156 Idaho 85,320 P.3d 1244 (2014)).

n. 8, 380 P.3d 681,696 n. 8 (2016) (citing Peterson v. Peterson,
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had). The Legislature's approval of the updated rule does not somehow prove that the
Amendment was not a clarification.

3. The Amendment clarified how Idaho Code Section 63-3613 should have been
applied all along and did not constitute a departure from the existing statute.
Chandler's sets forth multiple cases involving the effect of clarificatory amendments that
support its argument that the Gratuities are not part of the "sales price." Opening Brief pp. 15-23.
The cases advanced by Chandler's are instructive to this case and show that the question of
whether the Gratuities are subject to the sales tax under the pre-Amendment version of Idaho
Code Section 63-3613 can be answered by looking to the plain language of the pre-Amendment
statute and by looking at the Amendment (though not applying it retroactively).
The District Court did not address these cases or Chandler's' clarification argument,
instead focusing on the retroactivity date of the Amendment and basing its decision on the
Commission Rules. R. p. 131 (District Court Decision). Similarly, here the Commission has
broadly asserted that the cases are irrelevant because they all involved amendments that
strengthened the original laws and the cases did not involve retroactivity. Instead of directly
responding to one of Chandler's' central arguments, the Commission refers to its briefing to the
District Court related to the Idaho cases pertaining to clarification. Commission Brief p. 35
(citingR. pp. 117-121).
With respect to retroactivity, Chandler's does not assert that the subpart (f) of Idaho Code
Section 63-3613, added by the Amendment, should apply to the Gratuities. The Audit Period was
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cases based on presence

or lack of a retroactive date makes no difference. Additionally, absence of a retroactivity clause
in the cases supports Chandler's' position because "statutes should not be construed to be

despite the amendments' prospective application. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho at 1172, 963 P.2d at
735.
With respect to the Commission's argument that the cases involved strengthening of a
statute rather than a change in the law as seen here, Chandler's has set forth each case in detail
and contends each case is analogous to the instant case. For example, the amendment in
Stonecipher "clarified the language of the original statute by providing a list, though nonexhaustive, of terms to be encompassed by 'an action or proceeding to collect child support
arrearages."' Stonecipher, 131 Idaho at 735, 963 P.2d at 1172 (emphasis added) (applying the
reasoning behind a 1995 clarificatory amendment to a motion made before the amendment's
applicability, based also on the plain language on a 1988 statute). Similarly, here the plain
language of the pre-Amendment statute and the Amendment terms show that the Gratuities
should never have been subject to the sales tax.
Chandler's set forth three other cases involving similar analysis of a clarificatory
amendment. See Pearl v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Afed., 137 Idaho 107,
114, 44 P.3d 1162, 1169 (2002) (applying the reasoning behind a 2000 clarificatory amendment,
which was effective in 2000, to an administrative proceeding commenced in 1998, based on a
1998 statute); State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290, (1999) (the addition of an explicit
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not mean

statute

the

"legislature intended to simply clarify and strengthen" the statute); State v. Gillespie, 155 Idaho
714, 718-19, 316 P.3d 126, 129-30 (Ct. App. 2013) review denied (Aug. 5, 2014) (applying the

charged in 2008). 6
Under these cases, the fact that subpart (f) added an explicit exclusion for services like
the Gratuities from the sales tax does not mean that the concept embodied in subpart (f) was
somehow excluded from the plain meaning of the statute prior to the Amendment. Contrary to
the Commission's argument, the Amendment, like the clarificatory amendments seen in these
cases, clarified and strengthened the meaning ofldaho Code Section 63-3613 as it existed-and
should have been interpreted-all along.
C.

The Commission is not entitled to any attorney fees or costs.
1. The Commission is not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal because

Chandler's has a legitimate basis for its position that services should not be
taxed as personal property.
The Commission requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 633049(d), 12-117, and 12-121. The request should be denied because the Commission cannot
meet the standard of Idaho Code Section 63-3049(d), which is the exclusive means of awarding
fees in a judicial review of a Commission decision.

6 Chandler's also cited IA SUTHERLAND ON STAT. CONST. § 22:31 (2015) for the proposition that an amendment
adopted soon after a controversy arises related to a statute "must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the
meaning of the original act." Opening Brief p. 23. The Commission citations (Commission Brief pp. 34-35) to a
different section of that secondary source (Section 22:30) and one of the case footnotes for Section 22:31 that deals
with retroactivity do not undercut the applicability of this secondary authority to Chandler's clarification argument.
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attorney
in a particular statute, that statute provides the exclusive basis for fees. See, e.g., Block v.
City of Lewiston, 156 Idaho 484, 490, 328 P.3d 464, 470 (2014) (fees pursuant to Idaho Code

section 12-117 not available where IdaJ10 Tort Claims Act contained fee provision); Henry v.
Taylor, 152 Idaho 155, 162, 267 P.3d 1270, 1277 (2012) (fees pursuant to Idaho Code sections

12-117 and 12-121 not available where Public Records Act provided exclusive attorney fee
provision for those proceedings); First Fed. Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g, Inc., 154
Idaho 626, 632, 301 P.3d 632, 638 (2012) ("because section 45-513 is a specific statute
providing for the award of attorney fees in proceedings to foreclose a mechanic's lien, Idaho
Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121, which are general statutes, do not apply"); Shay v. Cesler,
132 Idaho 585, 587, 977 P.2d 199, 201 (1999) (no recovery of attorney fees under Idaho Code
Section 12-120 where wage claim statute containing attorney fee provision provided exclusive
basis for recovering fees).
Here, Idaho Code Section 63-3049(d) governs fee awards related to judicial review of
Commission decisions. That specific provision controls over general attorney fee provisions. See
Shay, 132 Idaho at 588, 977 P.2d at 202. Accordingly, the Commission's request for fees under

Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121 must be denied.
With respect to the Commission's request for fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 633049(d), that statute provides that:
Whenever it appears to the court that:
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Proceedings
instituted or
a
primarily for delay; or
(2) A party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or groundless; or
(3) A party unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative remedies;
the court, in its discretion, may require the party which did not prevail to pay to
the prevailing party costs, expenses and attorney's fees.
LC. § 63-3049(d).
The Commission appears to assert that Chandler's' arguments are frivolous or
groundless, though the Commission does not state which subsection(s) of Idaho Code Section
63-3049(d) apply. See Commission Brief p. 2 and pp. 38-39. In support of its fee request, the
Commission makes the same arguments it makes in the rest of its brief concerning legislative
history, plain meaning, retroactivity, and Jayo. Commission Brief pp. 38-39.
Chandler's has advanced legitimate arguments grounded in the express and plain
language ofldaho Code Section 63-3613. That language is different from the statute at issue in
Jayo. The case law cited in terms of the Legislature's power to clarify does not appear to have

been applied in this precise context before by this Court, and thus poses a novel question as to
the application of existing case law. This is not a situation where Chandler's' argument is based
on an "untenable" reading of the express statutory language, and Chandler's has offered a
"reasoned basis for [this Court] to blaze a new trail" in applying existing case law regarding
"clarification" by the Legislature (as opposed to the retroactive application discussion in Jayo) in
the context of taxation statutes. Hart v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 154 Idaho 621, 625, 301 P.3d
627, 631 (2012).

Chandler's' arguments are not frivolous and result from differing

interpretations of the language of the statute and the interpretative weight of the Amendment.

APPELLANT CHANDLER'S-BOISE, LLC'S REPLY BRIEF -19
13500475_3

costs

1S

are not

warranted under these circumstances.
2. The Commission waived its right to fees and costs at the District Court level.

The Commission requests costs and attorney fees under T.R.CP. 54(e) for the District
Court proceedings. The Commission, however, cannot recover those fees because (1) I.R.C.P.
54(e) is not applicable to a request for fees addressed to the Idaho Supreme Court, and (2) the
Commission failed to timely and properly requests fees and costs below and is therefore deemed
to have waived any such right to fees.
Rule 1 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, "[t]hese rules
govern the procedure and apply uniformly in the district court and the magistrate divisions of the
district courts in the State ofldaho .... " l.R.C.P. l(b). Likewise, Rule 2 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules provides "[t]hese rules shall govern all appeals and petitions for special writs or
proceedings in the Supreme Court." I.A.R. 2(a).

The Appellate Rules go on specifically to

provide a means to apply for attorneys fees on appeal in the form of Appellate Rule 41. Thus,
the current request for attorneys fees under I.R.C.P. 54(e) is misdirected to this Court.
The Commission originally mentioned a request for fees and costs in its reply brief in
support of summary judgment to the District Court, citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and asserting
Chandler's' arguments were frivolous and groundless. R. p. 123. The District Court Decision did
not address the request for fees and costs. R. pp. 126-131. The Commission never filed a
Memorandum of Costs within 14 days of entry of Judgment as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4),
which provides that "[f]ailure to timely file a memorandum of costs is a waiver of the right to
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costs

a

a

is not tantamount to

filing the required memorandum of fees and costs. See Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 102, 279 P.3d 80, 88 (2012) (citing applicable Idaho Rules of

Ci,vil Procedure to require that in order to qualif)' as a time!)' filed ''11emorandum of Costs," the

document at issue must "itemize each claimed expense," state "that to the best of the party's
knowledge and belief the items are correct and the costs are claimed in compliance with this
rule" and also state that "[t]he claim for attorneys fees as costs shall be supported by an affidavit
of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorneys fees claimed."). The
Commission thus waived its ability to recover fees at the District Court level.
Notably, the Commission has not cross-appealed any order addressing attorney fees
because there is no such order. With no proper request below, and no District Court order to
review on appeal, this issue is not before this Court and it has been waived.

III.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons and those set forth in Chandler's' Opening Brief, this Court should find
that the Gratuities are not subject to the sales tax as personal property under the plain language of
Idaho Code Sections 63-3613 and 63-3619, and should reverse the District Court Decision.

See also I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5), which provides that attorneys fees "are costs in an action and processed in the same
manner as other costs and included in the memorandum of costs."
7
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